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Problem Statement Natural disasters cannot be completely controlled by human management. Recently, 
flood damage in the U.S. has dramatically increased (Flood). The total U.S. population in 
coastal areas increased by 28 percent between the year 1980 and 2003 (Crossett, et al. 2004). 
The property value in coastal areas has increased as well. In the U.S, the growth rate of real 
estate value in coastal areas has been, on average, over 7 percent during last 50 years (Bin 
and Kruse, 2006).The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was introduced by the 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1978 to mitigate risk and loss of coastal and fluvial area 
residents from flood. NFIP offers discounted insurance premium rates and encourages people 
to protect themselves by constructing elevated houses or by installing storm shutters. 
Moreover, to prevent more properties from being exposed to flood hazard, NFIP provides 
fewer incentives for newly constructed buildings in flood zones. Despite the effort of the 
government to encourage people to buy insurance and reduce the damage level, many people 
still stay in uninsured (Burdy, 2001).  
Each year many people suffer from flood damage.  The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated that since 1980, losses related in 
hurricanes—the main reason for flood—exceed $84 billion (Pinelli, et al, 2004). According 
to a report by Crossett, et al. (2004) addressing coastal area population change, Florida 
experienced the largest population growth in the U.S.— a  75 percent increase. Because of 
ocean-views and other natural amenities, people are willing to pay more for housing and 
other costs. A population increase also causes more businesses move into the area. As a 
result, the value of properties in coastal areas has dramatically increased (Bin and Kruse, 
2006). Once a coastal area or fluvial area is damaged by a powerful flood such as the one 
caused by Hurricane Katrina or the Great flood in 1993, many people will suffer losses, and 
society will likely wish to provide financial aid to the area. 
 1In this study, I want to observe residents in coastal areas and find factors that 
influence flood insurance purchase. For various reasons, people who have properties in flood-
hazardous areas tend to avoid insuring their property from risk. By finding appropriate 




 According to Kunreuther, people undertake risk mitigation actions because of 
underestimation of risk probabilities, short-run expectation for benefits, limited budget, 
influence of neighbors, and expectation for government aids after disasters (2006).  
Kunreuther (1996) observed the importance of individual’s risk perception for 
deciding whether to purchase insurance or not. Higher risk perception causes in more 
consideration for purchasing insurance. McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey (1993) conducted 
a laboratory experiment about bidding for insurance between high frequency-low damage and 
low frequency-high potential damages. They found that people tend to bid too much or 
nothing on high risk-low probability events. In other words, people are severely cared about 
the high risk-low probability event or ignore completely. After many trials with bad events, 
choices converged to two results: people who bid zero initially made positive bids and people 
who made positive initial bids decreased their bid or bid zero. With the same manner, people 
tend to dismiss probability of losses from floods, because it does not happen frequently, and 
they have rare experiences. Besides the real probability of risk, personal risk perception 
affects on insurance purchase. 
Many researchers insist that income is an important variable in influencing insurance 
purchase. Browne and Hoyt (2000) addressed that a property owner with higher income has a 
greater probability of purchasing insurance and insure a greater amount than a property 
 2owner with lower income. At the first analysis, Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2010) could not 
find the significance of the income parameter, but when they divided income into several 
categories they found significant difference between higher income category and lower 
income category. Higher income householders purchase lager amount of coverage than lower 
income households.  
The FHA (Federal Housing Administration) requires the purchase of flood insurance 
to mortgage loan borrowers if they want to loan FHA-backed mortgage for the house which 
located in flood zones. In their research, Kriesel and Landry (2004) found mortgaged 
properties have a 73 percent greater probability of purchasing insurance. Landry and Jahan-
Parvar (2010) also found the mortgage is positively related to insurance purchase, though it is 
not a drastic correlation. However, Browne and Hoyt (2000) observed that mortgage and 
insurance purchase have a negative relation. They explained their unexpected finding due to 
avoidable elements of FHA mortgage conditions. 
 
Conceptual Framework  
The decision-making process with insurance differs from the decision-making 
process with commodity goods. People purchase insurances because of the uncertainty of the 
future, so insurance demand is affected by probabilities of risk. Smith (1968) and Mossin 
(1968) utilized the expected utility function to estimate the optimal insurance coverage level. 
Kriesel and Landry (2004) explained the decision to purchase insurance with the random 
utility maximization function. In this study, we focus on whether people purchase flood 
insurance or not.  Like Kriesel and Landry, we estimate the insurance demand by the utility 
maximization function. The utility function is Ui (pi, ri, di), where pi is variables related to 
physical characteristics of the property which is covered by insurance (i.e., distance from 
coasts, having mortgage, flood zones, whether the house constructed before FIRM(Flood 
 3Insurance Rating Map)), ri is variables related to individuals risk perception and risk 
preference, and di is demographic characteristics such as income. The utility function without 
insurance is defined U (p, r, d). The demand is expressed as binary choice; if Ui > U people 
purchase insurance, then “yes”. In contrast, if Ui < U people do not purchase insurance, then 
“no.”  
  The maximum likelihood method is the most popular method for estimation of 
probability of insurance demand. Logit regression is utilized to estimate the maximum 
likelihood of this model.   
 
Methods and Data 
We utilize the survey method to collect data. Usually, the survey method has a low 
response rate; therefore, to overcome this weakness, the survey is conducted by Knowledge 
Networks (KN).  They are, to our knowledge, the only survey firm that can legitimately say 
they have a true probability based sample for an online because they employed Knowledge 
Penal who is recruited by using random-digit dialing (RDD) or by using address-based 
sampling. In order to include people do not have internet access, KN provides internet access 
to households. During August to September in 2010, NK recruited 1536 homeowners in 95 
coastal counties along the Gulf Coast and Florida’s Atlantic Coast which have a relatively 
high possibility of flood and population density including Al, FL, LA, MS, and TX. Of 95 
coastal counties, 2 counties are from AL, 4 counties are from MS, 16 counties are from TX, 
28 counties are from LA, and 35 counties are from FL. We have 1070 completed responses. 
However, there are some missing values; some respondents skip certain questions. The actual 
response rate is 47% (720 observations) with 67% from FL, 24% from TX, 5% from LA, and 
4% collectively from AL and MS. 
 4In order to observe risk-related characteristics, we measured risk perception, risk 
preference, and the total number of past flood damage experiences. People are asked about 
their expectation for risky events. They estimate how much damage will be incurred when 
Category 3 hurricanes hit their house directly. Answers are measured by percentage with a 10 
percent interval, ranging from 0% to 100%. Higher percentage means higher expectation for 
risky events. Risk preference is estimated with a gamble. There are two choices for each 
question and, every time first choice has lower risk than another. Due to different probability 
of events we weighed answers. Higher risk choices count 1,2,3,4, or 5 points depending on 
probability, and lower-risk choice received 0 point. By adding all points, risk aversion is 
measured with a range from 0 to 15. Zero point means the participant is the most risk-loving 
and 15 points means the participant is the most risk-averse. Refer to table 1 for understanding 
survey questions. To find whether the previous flood damage experience affects decision-
making for insurance purchase, we asked whether people had flood damage experiences.   
Related to property characteristics we asked whether they have a mortgage loan for 
their house, whether they have flood insurance, and what year their house was constructed. 
Flood zones are organized into 5 categories from higher risk to low: V, A, B, C, non-flood 
zone. Only V and A zones have significant flood risk, therefore, we categorized flood zones 
as either SFHA or non-SFHA. SFHA includes V and A zones (1-percent annual chance 
flood), while other flood zones and the non-flood zone are included in non-SFHA. Queries 
for mortgage and insurance are simple binary questions. Additionally, based on property 
address, we measured the distance from coast to the house in meters. This is not directly 
related to insurance demand, but it can affect on people’s risk perception. CRS (Community 
Rating System) reports and incentivizes voluntary participation in protective actions of 
communities where properties are located. A lower number implies more participation in 
CRS and results in a higher deduction of insurance premiums. In addition, construction year 
 5of properties are asked to compare difference before and after FIRM (Flood Insurance Rating 
Maps). 
KN collects demographic information as well. Income is measured with 19 categories, 
with changing interval sizes. For example, first five categories increase by $2,499, and then 
difference is $4,999. For last four categories, which income is larger than $100,000, the 
difference increases by $24,999. House type is one of determinant for insurance premium, 
therefore, it probably affects on insurance demand. House type are divided to following five 
categories : Single-family house detached from any other house, single-family house attached 
to one or more houses, building with 2 or more apartments, mobile home, or boat, RV, etc.  
 
Results 
  A total of 720 observations is included in the regression model. Whether a person has 
flood insurance or not is the dependent variable, and other variables which included in utility 
function are all independent variables. Table 2 compares characteristics of population and 
sample in terms of age, gender, education, and ethnic. The target population is people aged 
18 and over residing in 95 coastal counties in the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas. From the comparison, our sample is older than the population.  The 
group of people 44 years or younger is smaller, and the group of people 60 years or older is 
larger than the population. Gender distribution is very similar; both have about 10 percent 
more female. For ethnicity, our sample has more Whites and fewer Blacks and Hispanics. 
Our sample is more educated. About 77 percent of our sample has at least high school degree, 
compare with 60 percent of the population.  
The descriptive statistic for variables, including variable type, observation number, 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, is presented in Table 3. Only 35 percent 
of total respondents have flood insurance, and 63 percent of people have mortgage. On 
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from the coast is 15,784 meters, and the mean value of income ranges $50,000 to $99,999. 
Some variables are categorized, so the mean value is not as important.  
Table 4 gives the detailed compositions of responses related to whether people have 
insurance. Among 720 observations, 252 (35%) people have insurance. More people who live 
in SFHA zone purchase flood insurance than those who live in non-SFHA zone: That is, 62% 
of those live in SFHA zone have insurance whereas 21% of those who live in non-SFHA 
zone have insurance. Next, the highest five and the lowest five categories of income are 
compared. Higher income categories have more positive answers for flood insurance 
purchase. There are two possible reasons; first, they have higher value of properties; second, 
they have more money. Lastly, we checked the relationship of mortgage loan and insurance 
purchase. People who have a mortgage loan purchase a slight amount of more flood 
insurance than people do not have it. With this simple comparison, we found those 
independent variables have an influence on the decision-making for flood insurance purchase. 
For normality test, kurtosis is tested with STATA program. Kurtosis 3 means normal 
distribution, so less than or more than 3 is reporting skewness of distribution. Because most 
variables are not normally distributed, logit regression model is utilized to estimate the 
maximum likelihood. Coefficients in logit model have no meaning by themselves, so, for 
better understanding, marginal effects for each variable are calculated.  
  Regression results and marginal effects are reported on table 5. Mortgage positively 
correlated with flood insurance purchase. If a house owner has a mortgage for the house, the 
probability of flood insurance purchasing is 9.9 percent more than the probability of a house 
owner without mortgage. The mandatory requirement of flood insurance for mortgage loan of 
houses which are located in flood hazardous areas probably affects the decision.  Perception 
of higher risk results in more likelihood of purchasing insurance. Based on the survey 
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10 percent more damage from the Category 3 hurricane—, the probability of insurance 
demand increases 1.9 percent. Risk preference is measured with a range from 0 to 15, with 
higher numbers meaning more risk-aversion. One unit of increased risk preference also 
increases likelihood of insurance purchase by 3 percent. As expected, risk-averse people have 
a greater probability of purchasing flood insurance than the risk-loving, however, risk 
preference is not significant at the 0.1 level. From literature reviews, it is known that income 
is positively related to insurance purchase. That is also indicated by regression results. Flood 
zone have a significantly positive coefficient. The marginal effect is 0.301, namely when the 
house is located in SFHA zone, the house owner has a 30 percent greater probability of 
purchasing flood insurance than a house owner in non-SFHA zone. Besides well-known 
influential variables, we observed the distance from coasts in order to estimate the risk 
perception related to location. The distance is negatively related in insurance purchase. A 
location farther from the coast reduces the probability of insurance purchase. Related to 
negative incentive for new constructions in flood hazardous areas, preFIRM properties have 
positive coefficient, therefore, properties are constructed before FIRM have more probability 
for flood insurance purchase. CRS also exhibits positive probability for insurance. Properties 
located in lower-rate participation communities are more likely to purchase flood insurance. 
Lastly, the influence of the past flood damage experience on insurance purchase is positive. 
People who have post flood damage have 4.2 percent more likely to purchase insurance, but 
the probability is not significant at the 0.1 level.  
    
Conclusions 
As expected, insurance purchase is positively affected by the individual’s risk 
perception, their risk preference, whether or not they have a mortgage, flood zone residence, 
 8their income, CRS, previous flood experience, and the year of construction of house. 
Coefficients of mortgage and risk perception, income, flood zone are significant at 0.05 the 
level. Additionally, the coefficient of distance from the coast is only significant at the 0.1 
level. In this study, we did not include property value in the model, because collected data 
quality was poor. To improve data we looked at real market values, but there was not enough 
information. For later studies, a more accurate measurement of house prices is required to get 
precise data. In addition, instead of using insurance premium, we utilized indirect 
measurement such as CRS. Participation in CRS reduces the insurance premium, and by 
observing CRS, the relationship between insurance premium and demand is indirectly 
observed. Moreover, we found interesting result from CRS. As more communities participate 
in CRS, insurers in those communities receive more deductions for insurance premiums. 
Therefore, because of the deducted price, people have less price constraint in purchasing 
flood insurance. However, this results in homeowners in lower participating communities 
being more likely to purchase flood insurance. Lowe-participation communities employ less 
protective action for flood damage, and as a result, homeowners perceive more risk. This 
indicates that the decision-making process purchasing insurance not only considers the price 
but also risk. For better understanding for flood insurance demand, various approaches for 
risk analysis are recommended.  
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 Table 1. Survey Questions Sample 
Risk perception  
Q22. Suppose a Category 3 hurricane (wind speeds of 111-130 mph) did directly strike your community.  How much damage (expressed as 
a percentage of total structure value) do you think your home would most likely suffer?  
0%----------20%----------40%-----50%-----60%----------80%----------100% 





Q.32 For the following, please indicate which possibility of gain, you prefer to face.  Keep in mind that one of these will be chosen to 
determine your actual earnings, so please take each decision seriously! 
 
○   A 1-out-of-10 chance of gaining $5 and a 9-out-of-10 chance of gaining $4  
  OR 
○   A 1-out-of-10 chance of gaining $9.50 and a 9-out-of-10 chance of gaining $0.50  
 
 12Table 2. Comparing Population and Sample Characteristics 
                Population            Sample  
    Category              N        Percentage                   N     Percentage 
Age 18-44  3,099,277 28.88  149 20.69
 45-59  3,311,592 30.86   250 34.72
 60+  4,320,005 40.26   321 44.58
    
Gender Male  5,041,316 46.98   330 45.83
 Female  5,689,558 53.02   390 54.17
    
Ethnic White,  non-hispanic  7,932,073 73.92   586 81.39
 Black,  non-hispanic  927,402 8.62   37 5.14
  Other, 2+Races, non-hispanic  458,652 4.27   25 3.47
 Hispanic  1,412,744 13.17   72 10
    
Education  High School or Below  4,183,801 38.99   162 22.5
 Some  College  2,881,327 26.85   229 31.81





Table 3.  Description of Summary Statistics of Variable  
 13Variable Description  Type  N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Insurance  Whether people have flood insurance 
(0 = no, 1 = yes)  Binary 720  0.350  0.4773  0  1 
Mortgage  Whether people have mortgage loan for 
houses (0 = no, 1 = yes)  Binary 720  0.629  0.4834  0  1 
Risk 
aversion 
Risk preference (large number is risk 
aversion)  Category 720  10.276  4.1812  0  15 
Risk 
perception  Personal risk perception (percentage)  Category  720  4.400  2.2626  1  11 
preFIRM  Whether the house was constructed before 
FIRM (0 = no, 1 = yes)  Binary 720  0.436  0.4962  0  1 
Distance  Distance from the coast (meters)  Continuous  720  15784  17375  0  78198.3 
Flood zone  SFHA zone or non-SFHA zone  
(0 = no, 1 = yes)  Binary 720  0.225  0.4179  0  1 
House type  House type  Category  720  1.324  0.8029  1  5 
Experience  Previous flood damage experience  
(0 = no, 1 = yes)  Continuous 720  0.345  0.4759 0  1 
CRS  Community Rating System Classification  Category  720  6.913  1.4533  5  10 
Income 
Household income 
            (  1=less than $5,000 
 2=$5,000 to $7,499 
 3=$7,500 to $9,999 
 4=$10,000 to $12,499 
 5=$12,500 to $14,999 
 6=$15,000 to $19,999 
 7=$20,000 to $24,999 
 8=$25,000 to $29,999 
 9=$30,000 to $34,999 
10=$35,000 to $39,999 
11=$40,000 to $49,999 
12=$50,000 to $59,999 
13=$60,000 to $74,999 
14=$75,000 to $84,999 
15=$85,000 to $99,999 
Category 720  12.050  3.9602  1  19 
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16=$100,000 to $124,999 
17=$125,000 to $149,999 
18=$150,000 to $174,999 







Table 4. Detail for Responses for Insurance Purchase by Variables 
      N  Percentage 
Insurance No  468  65.00% 
 Yes  252  35.00% 
 Total  720  100.00% 
      
SFHAzone No  62  38.27% 
 Yes  100  61.73% 
 Total  162  100.00% 
      
non-SFHAzone No  400  72.76% 
 Yes  152  27.24% 
 Total  558  100.00% 
      
Income      
Highest 5 categories  No  112  53.33% 
 Yes  98  46.67% 
 Total  210  100.00% 
      
Lowest 5 categories  No  39  81.25% 
 Yes  9  18.75% 
 Total  48  100.00% 
      
Mortgage -yes  No  275  60.71% 
 Yes  178  39.29% 
 Total  458  100.00% 
      
Mortgage -no  No  193  72.28% 
 Yes  74  27.72% 
   Total  267  100.00% Table 5. Regression Results of Logit Model and Marginal Effect for Flood Insurance Demand 
 
N= 720  Likelihood=-409.75109           
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  z  p>|z|     Marginal  Effect+ 
Mortgage 0.513282  0.187473  2.74  0.006  **  0.097755 
Risk perception  0.102679  0.039577  2.58  0.010  **  0.019725 
Risk aversion  0.017196  0.021040  0.82  0.414    0.003315 
Income 0.102678  0.024047  4.10  0.000  **  0.019797 
Flood zone  1.561998  0.202346  7.72  0.000  **  0.340596 
Distance -0.000009  0.000005  -1.83  0.067  *  -0.000002 
preFIRM 0.120750  0.179649  0.67  0.501    0.003860 
CRS 0.005214  0.059133  0.09  0.930    0.001005 
Experience 0.218290  0.181834  1.20  0.230    0.042517 
House type  -0.213140  0.127123  -1.68  0.094    -0.041095 
Constant -2.975240  0.685020  -4.34  0.000     
 
Note : * significant at 0.1 level  
           ** significant at 0.05 level 
           + For binary questions, marginal effect for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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